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Abstract—The Internet and, in particular, Online Social Net-
works have changed the way that terrorist and extremist groups
can influence and radicalise individuals. Recent reports show
that the mode of operation of these groups starts by exposing
a wide audience to extremist material online, before migrating
them to less open online platforms for further radicalization.
Thus, identifying radical content online is crucial to limit the
reach and spread of the extremist narrative. In this paper,
our aim is to identify measures to automatically detect radical
content in social media. We identify several signals, including
textual, psychological and behavioural, that together allow for
the classification of radical messages. Our contribution is three-
fold: (1) we analyze propaganda material published by extremist
groups and create a contextual text-based model of radical
content, (2) we build a model of psychological properties inferred
from these material, and (3) we evaluate these models on Twitter
to determine the extent to which it is possible to automatically
identify online radical tweets. Our results show that radical users
do exhibit distinguishable textual, psychological, and behavioural
properties. We find that the psychological properties are among
the most distinguishing features. Additionally, our results show
that textual models using vector embedding features significantly
improves the detection over TF-IDF features. We validate our
approach on two experiments achieving high accuracy. Our find-
ings can be utilized as signals for detecting online radicalization
activities.
Index Terms—radicalization, extremism, data mining, social
media, machine learning, Twitter
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of Online Social Networks (OSN) has facilitated
a wide application of its data as sensors for information to
solve different problems. For example, Twitter data has been
used for predicting election results, detecting the spread of
flu epidemics, and a source for finding eye-witnesses during
criminal incidents and crises [1], [2]. This phenomenon is
possible due to the great overlap between our online and
offline worlds. Such seamless shift between both worlds has
also affected the modus operandi of cyber-criminals and ex-
tremist groups [3]. They have benefited tremendously from
the Internet and OSN platforms as it provides them with
opportunities to spread their propaganda, widen their reach
for victims, and facilitate potential recruitment opportunities.
For instance, recent studies show that the Internet and social
media played an important role in the increased amount of
violent, right-wing extremism [4]. Similarly, radical groups
such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS have used social media to spread
their propaganda and promoted their digital magazine, which
inspired the Boston Marathon bombers in 2010 [5].
To limit the reach of cyber-terrorists, several private and
governmental organizations are policing online content and
utilising big data technologies to minimize the damage and
counter the spread of such information. For example, the UK
launched a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit in 2010
aiming to remove unlawful Internet content and it supports
the police in investigating terrorist and radicalizing activities
online. The Unit reports that among the most frequently
referred links were those coming from several OSNs, such
as Facebook and Twitter [3]. Similarly, several OSNs are
constantly working on detecting and removing users promoting
extremist content. In 2018, Twitter announced that over 1.2
million accounts were suspended for terrorist content [6].
Realizing the danger of violent extremism and radicaliza-
tion and how it is becoming a major challenge to societies
worldwide, many researchers have attempted to study the
behaviour of pro-extremist users online. Looking at existing
literature, we find that a number of existing studies incorporate
methods to identify distinguishing properties that can aid in
automatic detection of these users [7], [8]. However, many of
them depend on performing a keyword-based textual analysis
which, if used alone, may have several shortcomings, such as
producing a large number of false positives and having a high
dependency on the data being studied. In addition, it can be
evaded using automated tools to adjust the writing style.
Another angle for analyzing written text is by looking at the
psychological properties that can be inferred regarding their
authors. This is typically called psycholinguistics, where one
examines how the use of the language can be indicative of
different psychological states. Examples of such psychological
properties include introversion, extroversion, sensitivity, and
emotions. One of the tools that automates the process of
extracting psychological meaning from text is the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) [9] tool. This approach
has been used in the literature to study the behaviour of
different groups and to predict their psychological states,
such as predicting depression [10]. More recently, it has also
been applied to uncover different psychological properties of
extremist groups and understand their intentions behind the
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recruitment campaigns [11].
Building on the findings of previous research efforts, this
paper aims to study the effects of using new textual and
psycholinguistic signals to detect extremist content online.
These signals are developed based on insights gathered from
analyzing propaganda material published by known extremist
groups. In this study, we focus mainly on the ISIS group
as they are one of the leading terrorist groups that utilise
social media to share their propaganda and recruit individuals.
We analyze the propaganda material they publish in their
online English magazine called Dabiq, and use data-mining
techniques to computationally uncover contextual text and
psychological properties associated with these groups. From
our analysis of these texts, we are able to extract a set of
signals that provide some insight into the mindset of the radical
group. This allows us to create a general radical profile that we
apply as a signal to detect pro-ISIS supporters on Twitter. Our
results show that these identified signals are indeed critical to
help improve existing efforts to detect online radicalization.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, there has been an increase in online accounts
advocating and supporting terrorist groups such as ISIS [6].
This phenomenon has attracted researchers to study their
online existence, and research ways to automatically detect
these accounts and limit their spread. Ashcroft et al. [7]
make an attempt to automatically detect Jihadist messages
on Twitter. They adopt a machine-learning method to classify
tweets as ISIS supporters or not. In the article, the authors
focus on English tweets that contain a reference to a set of
predefined English hashtags related to ISIS. Three different
classes of features are used, including stylometric features,
temporal features and sentiment features. However, one of the
main limitations of their approach is that it is highly dependent
on the data. Rowe and Saif [8] focused on studying Europe-
based Twitter accounts in order to understand what happens
before, during, and after they exhibit pro-ISIS behaviour.
They define such behaviour as sharing of pro-ISIS content
and/or using pro-ISIS terms. To achieve this, they use a term-
based approach such that a user is considered to exhibit a
radicalization behaviour if he/she uses more pro-ISIS terms
than anti-ISIS terms. While such an approach seems effective
in distinguishing radicalised users, it is unable to properly
deal with lexical ambiguity (i.e., polysemy). Furthermore,
in [12] the authors focused on detecting Twitter users who
are involved with “Media Mujahideen”, a Jihadist group who
distribute propaganda content online. They used a machine
learning approach using a combination of data-dependent and
data-independent features. Similar to [8] they used textual
features as well as temporal features to classify tweets and
accounts. The experiment was based on a limited set of Twitter
accounts, which makes it difficult to generalize the results for
a more complex and realistic scenario.
Radicalization literature also looked at psychological factors
involved with adopting such behaviour. Torok [13] used a
grounded theory approach to develop an explanatory model
for the radicalization process utilizing concepts of psychiatric
power. Their findings show that the process typically starts
with the social isolation of individuals. This isolation seems
to be self-imposed as individuals tend to spend a long time
engaging with radical content. This leads to the concept
of homophily, the tendency to interact and associate with
similar others. Through constant interaction with like-minded
people, an individual gradually strengthens their mindset and
progresses to more extreme levels. Similarly, they start to feel
as being part of a group with a strong group identity which
leads to group polarization. In psychology, group polarization
occurs when discussion leads the group to adopt actions that
are more extreme than the initial actions of the individual
group members [14]. Moreover, the National Police Service
Agency of the Netherlands developed a model to describe the
phases a Jihadist may pass through before committing an act of
terrorism [15]. These sequential phases of radicalism include
strong links between the person’s psychological and emotional
state (e.g., social alienation, depression, lack of confidence in
authority) and their susceptibility to radicalization.
III. METHODOLOGY
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our approach consists of two
main phases: Phase 1:Radical Properties Extraction, where
articles from Dabiq extremist magazines are input into this
step to perform two parallel tasks. In the first task, we
build a language model using (i) Term-Frequency Inverse-
Document-Frequency (TF-IDF) scores of uni-, bi-, and tri-
grams, and (ii) Word embeddings generated from a word2vec
model [16]. The output of this task is a radical corpus of
top k-grams, and a word embedding model giving a vector
representation for each word in the corpus. The second task
seeks to create a psychological profile based on the language
used in the extremist propaganda articles, consisting of a set
of emotional and topical categories using LIWC dictionary-
based tool. Phase 2: Tweet classification involves the use of
the models generated from Phase 1 to engineer features related
to radical activities. We identify three groups of features and
then train a binary classifier to detect radical tweets.
A. Feature Engineering
Feature engineering is the process of exploring large spaces
of heterogeneous features with the aim of discovering mean-
ingful features that may aid in modeling the problem at hand.
We explore three categories of information to identify relevant
features to detect radical content. Some features are user-based
while others are message-based. The three categories are: 1)
Radical language (Textual features FT ); 2) Psychological sig-
nals (Psychological features FP ); and 3) Behavioural features
(FB). In the following, we detail each of these categories.
1) Radical Language: In order to understand how radical
messages are constructed and used, as mentioned earlier, we
analyze content of ISIS propaganda material published in
Dabiq magazine. Dabiq is an online magazine published by
ISIS terrorist groups with the purpose of recruiting people
and promoting their propaganda and ideology. Using this data
Fig. 1: Approach overview
source, we investigate what topics, textual properties, and
linguistic cues exist in these magazines. Our intuition is that
utilising these linguistic cues from the extremist propaganda
would allow us to detect supporters of ISIS group who are
influenced by their propaganda.
We use two methods to extract the radical language from
the propaganda corpus. First we calculate tf-idf scores for
each gram in the propaganda corpus. We use uni-grams,
bi-grams, and tri-grams to capture phrases and context in
which words are being used. We then select the top scoring
grams to be used as features for the language model. N-
grams and words frequency have been used in the literature to
classify similar problems, such as hate-speech and extremist
text and have proven successful [17]. The second method
we use is word embeddings to capture semantic meanings.
Research in NLP has compared the effectiveness of word
embedding methods for encoding semantic meaning and found
that semantic relationships between words are best captured by
word vectors within word embedding models [18]. Therefore,
we train word2vec model on our propaganda corpus to build
the lexical semantic aspects of the text using vector space
models. We learn word embeddings using skip-gram word2vec
model implemented in the gensim package1 with vector size
of 100 and window size of 5. This word embedding model
is used to obtain the vector representation for each word.
We aggregate the vectors for each word in the tweet, and
concatenate the maximum and average for each word vector
dimension, such that any given tweet is represented in 200
dimension sized vector. This approach of aggregating vectors
was used successfully in previous research [19]. Moreover,
since ISIS supporters typically advocate for violent behaviour
and tend to use offensive curse words, we use dictionaries of
violent words2 and curse words3 to record the ratio of such
words in the tweet. We also count the frequency of words
with all capital letters as they are traditionally used to convey
yelling behaviour.
2) Psychological Signals: Research in fields such as lin-
guistics, social science, and psychology suggest that the use
of language and the word choices we make in our daily
1https://radimrehurek.com/gensim/models/word2vec.html
2https://myvocabulary.com/word-list/terrorism-vocabulary
3https://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼biglou/resources/bad-words.txt
communication, can act as a powerful signal to detect our
emotional and psychological states [9]. Several psychological
properties are unintentionally transmitted when we commu-
nicate. Additionally, literature from the fields of terrorism
and psychology suggests that terrorists may differ from non-
terrorists in their psychological profiles [20]. A number of
studies looked at the motivating factors surrounding terrorism,
radicalization, and recruitment tactics, and found that terrorist
groups tend to target vulnerable individuals who have feelings
of desperation and displaced aggression. In particular research
into the recruiting tactics of ISIS groups, it was found that
they focus on harnessing the individual’s need for signifi-
cance. They seek out vulnerable people and provide them
with constant attention [21]. Similarly, these groups create a
dichotomy and promote the mentality of dividing the world
into “us” versus “them” [22]. Inspired by previous research,
we extract psychological properties from the radical corpus in
order to understand the personality, emotions, and the different
psychological properties conveyed in these articles.
We utilise LIWC dictionaries to assign a score to a set of
psychological, personality, and emotional categories. Mainly,
we look at the following properties: (1) Summary variables:
Analytically thinking which reflects formal, logical, and hi-
erarchical thinking (high value), versus informal, personal,
and narrative thinking (low value). Clout which reflects high
expertise and confidence levels (high value), versus tentative,
humble, and anxious levels (low value). Tone which reflects
positive emotions (high value) versus more negative emotions
such as anxiety, sadness, or anger (low value). Authentic
which reflects whether the text is conveying honesty and
disclosing (high value) versus more guarded, and distanced
(low value). (2) Big five: Measures the five psychological
properties (OCEAN), namely Openness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. (3) Emotional
Analysis: Measures the positive emotions conveyed in the text,
and the negative emotions (including anger, sadness, anxiety).
(4) Personal Drives: Focuses on five personal drives, namely
power, reward, risk, achievement, and affiliation. (5) Personal
Pronouns: Counts the number of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd personal
pronouns used. For each Twitter user, we calculate their
psychological profiles across these categories. Additionally,
using Minkowski distance measure, we calculate the distance
between each of these profiles and the average values of the
psychological properties created from the ISIS magazines.
3) Behaviour Signals: This category consists of measuring
behavioural features to capture different properties related to
the user and their behaviour. This includes how active the user
is (frequency of tweets posted) and the followers/following
ratio. Additionally, we use features to capture users’ interac-
tions with others through using hashtags, and engagement in
discussions using mention action. To capture this, we construct
the mention interaction graph (GM ) from our dataset, such
that GM = (U,E), where U represents the user nodes and E
represents the set of edges. The graph GM is a directed graph,
where an edge e exists between two user nodes A and B, if
user A mentions user B. After constructing the graph, we mea-
sure the degree of influence each user has over their network
using different centrality measures, such as degree centrality,
betweenness centrality, and HITS-Hub. Such properties have
been adopted in the research literature to study properties of
cyber-criminal networks and their behaviour [23], [24].
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset
We acquired a publicly available dataset of tweets posted
by known pro-ISIS Twitter accounts that was published during
the 2015 Paris attacks by Kaggle data science community4.
The dataset consists of around 17, 000 tweets posted by more
than 100 users. These tweets were labelled as being pro-ISIS
by looking at specific indicators, such as a set of keywords
used (in the user’s name, description, tweet text), their network
of follower/following of other known radical accounts, and
sharing of images of the ISIS flag or some radical leaders. To
validate that these accounts are indeed malicious, we checked
the current status of the users’ accounts in the dataset and
found that most of them had been suspended by Twitter. This
suggests that they did, in fact, possess a malicious behaviour
that opposes the Twitter platform terms of use which caused
them to be suspended. We filter out any tweets posted by
existing active users and label this dataset as known-bad.
To model the normal behaviour, we collected a random
sample of tweets from ten-trending topics in Twitter using
the Twitter streaming API. These topics were related to news
events and on-going social events (e.g., sports, music). We
filter out any topics and keywords that may be connected to
extremist views. This second dataset consists of around 8, 000
tweets published by around 1, 000 users. A random sample of
200 tweets was manually verified to ascertain it did not contain
radical views. We label this dataset as our random-good data.
A third dataset is used which was acquired from Kaggle
community5. This dataset is created to be a counterpoise to
the pro-ISIS dataset (our known-bad) as it consists of tweets
talking about topics concerning ISIS without being radical. It
contains 122, 000 tweets from around 95, 000 users collected
on two separate days. We verify that this dataset is indeed non
4https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter/data
5https://www.kaggle.com/activegalaxy/isis-related-tweets/home
radical by checking the status of users in Twitter and found
that a subset (24, 000 users) was suspended. We remove those
from the dataset and only keep users that are still active on
Twitter. This dataset is labelled as counterpoise data.
We performed a series of preprocessing steps to clean the
complete dataset and prepare it for feature extraction. These
steps are: (1) We remove any duplicates and re-tweets from
the dataset in order to reduce noise. (2) We remove tweets
that have been authored by verified users accounts, as they
are typically accounts associated with known public figures.
(3) All stop words (e.g., and, or, the) and punctuation marks
are removed from the text of the tweet. (4) If the tweet text
contains a URL, we record the existence of the URL in a new
attribute, hasURL, and then remove it from the tweet text. (5)
If the tweet text contains emojis (e.g., :-), :), :P), we record
the existence of the emoji in a new attribute, hasEmj, and then
remove it from the tweet text. (6) If the tweet text contains
any words with all capital characters, we record its existence
in a new attribute, allCaps, and then normalize the text to
lower-case and filter out any non-alphabetic characters. (7) We
tokenize the cleansed tweet text into words, then we perform
lemmatization, the process of reducing inflected words to their
roots (lemma), and store the result in a vector.
B. Experimental Set-up
We conducted two experiments using the datasets described
in Section IV-A. Our hypothesis is that supporters of groups
such as ISIS may exhibit similar textual and psychological
properties when communicating in social media to the proper-
ties seen in the propaganda magazines. A tweet is considered
radical if it promotes violence, racism, or supports violent
behaviour. In Exp 1 we use the first two datasets, i.e., the
known-bad and the random-good datasets to classify tweets
to radical and normal classes. For Exp 2 we examine if
our classifier can also distinguish between tweets that are
discussing similar topics (ISIS related) by using the known-
bad and the counterpoise datasets.
The classification task is binomial (binary) classification
where the output of the model predicts whether the input
tweet is considered radical or normal. In order to handle
the imbalanced class problem in the dataset, there are mul-
tiple techniques suggested in the literature Oversampling or
undersampling of the minority/majority classes are common
techniques. Another technique that is more related to the
classification algorithm is cost sensitive learning, which pe-
nalizes the classification model for making a mistake on the
minority class. This is achieved by applying a weighted cost
on misclassifying of the minority class [25]. We will use the
last approach to avoid downsampling of our dataset.
Previous research investigating similar problems reported
better performances for Random Forest (RF) classifiers [26].
RF usually performs very well as it is scalable and is robust
to outliers. RF typically outperforms decision trees as it has
a hierarchical structure and is based on multiple trees. This
allows RF to be able to model non-linear decision boundaries.
Moreover, Neural Networks (NN) also produced good results
TABLE I: Exp 1: Evaluation metrics across all feature groups
Features AC Precision Recall F-measure
FT (tf − idf) 0.52 0.76 0.52 0.37
FT (w2v) 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81
FT 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
FB 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94
FP 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
FALL 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
TABLE II: Exp 2: Evaluation metrics across all feature groups
Features AC Precision Recall F-measure
FT (tf − idf) 0.56 0.69 0.56 0.48
FT (w2v) 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
FT 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
FB 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91
FP 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
FALL 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
when applied to problems related to image recognition, text
and natural language processing [27]. However, they usually
tend to require very large amounts of data to train. For
the purpose of this study, we experimented with multiple
classification algorithms, including RF, NN, SVM, and KNN
and found that RF and NN produced the best performance.
Due to space limitation, we only report results obtained using
RF model. We configured the model to use 100 estimators trees
with a maximum depth of 50, and we selected gini impurity
for the split criteria. We used the out-of-bag samples (oob)
score to estimate the generalization accuracy of the model.
Additionally, since RF tends to be biased towards the majority
class, we apply the cost sensitive learning method described
earlier to make RF more suitable for imbalanced data [25].
We divided the dataset to training set (80%) and testing set
(20%), where the testing set is held out for validation. We
reported validation results using different combinations of the
features categories (i.e., FT , FB , FP ) and different evaluation
metrics: accuracy, recall, precision, f-measure, and area under
the ROC curve. Recall measures how many radical tweets we
are able to detect, while precision measures how many radical
tweets we can detect without falsely accusing anyone. For
instance, if we identify every single tweet as radical, we will
expose all radical tweets and thus obtain high recall, but at the
same time, we will call everyone in the population a radical
and thus obtain low precision. F-measure is the average of
both precision and recall.
C. Results
Exp 1: The classification results using the known-bad and
random-good datasets are reported in Table I. The table shows
the average accuracy, precision, recall and f-measure scores
obtained from each feature category (FT , FP , FB) and their
combination (FAll). We also compared the two textual models,
and find that results obtained from using word embedding out-
performs the use of n-grams tf-idf scores. This confirms that
contextual information is important in detecting radicalization
activities. Furthermore, our model performed best using the
FP features across all metrics. This means that the model is
able to distinguish between both radical and non-radical with
high confidence using only FP .
Fig. 2: ROC curve for Exp1 (top), Exp2 (bottom).
Exp2: In this experiment, we tested the performance of
our classifier in distinguishing between radical and normal
tweets that discusses ISIS-related topics. Although this task
is more challenging given the similarity of the topic discussed
in the two classes, we find that the model still achieves high
performance. Table II shows the different metrics obtained
from each feature category. The FT feature group obtains
80% accuracy, and 91%, 100% for FB and FP feature groups,
respectively. The results are consistent with the ones obtained
from the first experiment with the features from FP group
contributing to the high accuracy of the model. The area under
the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, which
measures accuracy based on TP, and FP rates, is shown in
Fig. 2 for each classification model.
D. Features Significance
We investigated which features contribute most to the clas-
sification task to distinguish between radical and non-radical
tweets. We used the mean decrease impurity method of random
forests [28] to identify the most important features in each
feature category. The ten most important features are shown
in Table III. We found that the most important feature for dis-
tinguishing radical tweets is the psychological feature distance
measure. This measures how similar the Twitter user is to the
average psychological profile calculated from the propaganda
magazine articles. Following this is the Us-them dichotomy
which looks at the total number of pronouns used (I,they,
we, you). This finding is in line with the tactics reported in
TABLE III: Features Importance
Top 10 Features Category
1 Radical psych-profile distance FP
2 Us-Them dichotomy FP
3 # of mentions a user make FB
4 User rank (hub and authority) FB
5 Sad emotion FP
6 Risk driver FP
7 All-caps count FT
8 URL count FT
9 Violent-word ratio FT
10 Hash count FT
the radicalization literature with regards to emphasizing the
separation between the radical group and the world.
Moreover, among the top contributing features are be-
havioural features related to the number of mentions a single
user makes, and their HITS hub and authority rank among
their interaction network. This relates to how active the user
is in interacting with other users and how much attention
they receive from their community. This links to the ob-
jectives of those radical users in spreading their ideologies
and reaching out to potential like-minded people. As for the
FT category, we find that the use of word2vec embedding
improves the performance in comparison with using the tf-idf
features. Additionally, all bi-grams and tri-grams features did
not contribute much to the classification; only uni-grams did.
This can be related to the differences in the writing styles when
constructing sentences and phrases in articles and in the social
media context (especially given the limitation of the number
of words allowed by the Twitter platform). Additionally, the
violent word ratio, longWords, and allCaps features are among
the top contributing features from this category. This finding
agrees to a large extent with observations from the literature
regarding dealing with similar problems, where the use of
dictionaries of violent words aids with the prediction of violent
extremist narrative.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we identified different signals that can be
utilized to detect evidence of online radicalization. We de-
rived linguistic and psychological properties from propaganda
published by ISIS for recruitment purposes. We utilize these
properties to detect pro-ISIS tweets that are influenced by their
ideology. Unlike previous efforts, these properties do not only
focus on lexical keyword analysis of the messages, but also
add a contextual and psychological dimension. We validated
our approach in different experiments and the results show
that this method is robust across multiple datasets. This system
can aid law enforcement and OSN companies to better address
such threats and help solve a challenging real-world problem.
In future work, we aim to investigate if the model is resilient
to different evasion techniques that users may adopt. We will
also expand the analysis to other languages.
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